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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES IX 
Margaret A. Berger∗  
The papers that follow are extended remarks of presentations 
made at the ninth and final Science for Judges program held at 
Brooklyn Law School on April 13 and 14, 2007. These twice 
yearly conferences, generously funded by the Common Benefit 
Trust established in the Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability 
Litigation, began in March 2001. Their objective was to assist 
judges in their difficult task of evaluating the admissibility of highly 
complex and specialized expert testimony. Despite supplying most 
of the monetary resources that made these programs possible, the 
Trust was scrupulous in playing no role with regard to the 
programs’ contents, or in the selection of speakers. 
The programs were held under the auspices of Brooklyn Law 
School’s Center for Health, Science and Public Policy in 
collaboration with the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center 
for State Courts, and the Committee on Science, Technology and 
Law of the National Academies of Science. Judges from every 
federal circuit and more than 36 states participated in these 
conferences. 
Many of the presentations at prior Science for Judges programs 
focused on issues pertinent to proving causation in pharmaceutical 
and environmental litigation. This emphasis was largely due to the 
judicial community’s interest in the Daubert trilogy, a series of 
three opinions by the United States Supreme Court on proving 
causation.1 The first case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
                                                           
 ∗  Suzanne J. & Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
1 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 5226 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric 
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993). See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a toxic tort case, in which proof of causation 
was crucial, was undoubtedly the chief impetus for the Science for 
Judges programs. In its opinion, the Supreme Court obligated 
federal trial judges to screen proffered expert opinions for scientific 
validity. In order to exercise this “gatekeeper” function when 
scientific testimony is proffered, judges need to understand 
scientific methodology. Although Daubert applied only in federal 
courts, it has been adopted by many states and has clearly had an 
impact on the treatment of expert testimony in all jurisdictions.2 
The previous Science for Judges programs discussed a broad 
range of topics that had a bearing on toxic tort cases. Some 
presentations dealt specifically with the science used to prove 
causation, such as epidemiology and toxicology; others programs 
looked at particular litigations, such as those involving asbestos and 
Agent Orange; and still others looked at a wide variety of 
peripheral subjects that nevertheless affect science in a courtroom, 
subjects as diverse as conflicts of interest in academia, preemption, 
the handling of data, the role of the FDA and EPA, and evidence-
based medicine. Other programs focused on the interaction of 
science and law outside the toxic tort context; there were, for 
instance, programs on forensic science, the impact of Daubert on 
administrative agencies, and the admissibility of evidence that 
relates to human behavior.3 
                                                           
EVIDENCE 9 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000). 
2 See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the 
States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351 (2004). 
3 Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found at 12 J.L. 
& POL’Y 1, 1–53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and 
the science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485, 
485–639 (2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 1–179 (2005) (papers discussing the integrity of scientific research and 
forensic evidence in criminal proceedings); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 499, 499–647 
(2005) (papers discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research); and 14 
J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–209 (2006) (papers discussing risk assessment dealing with 
expert proof of causation in toxic tort cases and issues relevant to the availability 
of data); 14 J.L. & POL’Y 525, 525–616 (2006) (papers discussing evidence-
based medicine); 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–164 (2007) (papers discussing the 
evidence of causation as well as current issues and standards of forensic 
laboratories); 15 J.L. & POL’Y 983, 983–1223 (papers discussing the regulation 
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Because the April 2007 program would be the last, we sought 
to design a program that would provide a fitting close. We had two-
overarching goals. First, we wished to touch base once again with 
issues about Daubert and causation. Second, we wanted to use a 
format that would allow participants to engage more actively with 
the types of materials that judges must evaluate when science 
enters the courtroom. 
The first topic discussed at Science for Judges IX was juries. 
Questions about jury competence to decide complex scientific 
issues lurk in the background of Daubert. When Daubert hearings 
result in the exclusion of plaintiff’s experts, a court often grants 
summary judgment; this of course means that no jury will hear the 
case or render a verdict. In such cases, the result is identical to that 
which could be reached through a complexity exception to the 
Seventh Amendment, a path that to date the Supreme Court has 
not endorsed.4 Daubert has therefore operated to deflect direct 
attacks on the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 
Juries are of interest not only because of the effect issues of 
jury competency may have on Daubert jurisprudence. Not 
infrequently, judges must rule on whether an expert may testify to 
opinions based on social science research. The reliability 
requirement of Daubert was extended to all experts by the Kumho 
case so that judges must know how to evaluate studies such as 
those currently being done on how juries function. 
The Science for Judges program was extremely fortunate that 
Professors Valerie P. Hans and Shari Seidman Diamond, two of the 
most distinguished scholars in the field of jury research, spoke at 
the program held at Brooklyn Law School and in addition 
submitted articles that appear below. 
Professor Hans’ designed an ingenious experiment that sought 
to achieve a number of objectives: to compare the abilities of judges 
versus jurors, to explain something to judges about study design, 
and to engage judges in an interactive learning exercise about a 
                                                           
of pharmaceuticals and the scientific issues regarding asbestos litigation). All 
papers are available in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/centers/sciencefor 
judges/papers.php. 
4 But see Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (in 
patent infringement actions construction claims to be decided by court not jury). 
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complex scientific subject, mitochondrial DNA. Her article, Judges, 
Juries, and Scientific Evidence,5 describes how this was done and 
furnishes a number of important insights on how juries function vis 
a vis judges. She repeated with the participants at the program an 
experiment that had originally been done through a jury study at a 
mock trial. I do not want to give further details about what she and 
the judges at the program achieved together because she tried a 
unique approach that can best be experienced through her words 
rather than mine. In addition, her article furnishes an excellent 
introduction to the literature on jury competence in complex cases. 
Professor Shari Seidman Diamond’s article reports conclusions 
that have been reached in empirical studies of juries.6 She also 
reports on findings that have emerged from a multi-faceted study of 
juries in the state of Arizona where she has been given permission 
to observe actual jury deliberations. She examines a number of 
techniques that Arizona adopted that were aimed at facilitating jury 
performance. Some of these, which Professor Diamond discusses, 
were specifically designed to enable jurors to deal more effectively 
with expert testimony. Her findings indicate that a number of 
simple measures could improve jury comprehension. 
Professor Diamond’s discussion also touches on an important 
circumstance that is often ignored in comparisons of the abilities of 
judges and jurors. Although some jurors may lack the education 
required to understand scientific testimony, other jurors may have 
relevant skills that surpass that of the judge.7 Both Professors 
Diamond and Hans note that jurors can learn from each other, and 
that accordingly a jury is potentially as competent as its most 
highly qualified member. Looking at the lowest common 
denominator does a disservice to how jurors function. Taken 
together, the two articles offer a thoughtful rebuttal to critics of the 
jury system who are convinced that lay jurors are incapable of 
discharging their constitutional obligations. 
The final two articles published in connection with Science for 
                                                           
5 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19 (2007). 
6 Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert Testimony and 
How Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007). 
7 Id. at 63–64. 
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Judges IX return to the problems that are encountered when trying 
to show that adverse health effects are the result of an exposure to 
toxic substances. Dr. John Howard, the Director of the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and the Coordinator 
of the World Trade Center Health Programs, United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, sets out in detail the 
contours of a problem that may occupy the legal system for years 
to come. His article, The World Trade Center Disaster: Health 
Effects and Compensation Mechanisms,8 examines the many 
different exposures to toxic materials that occurred as a 
consequence of the terrible events of September 11, 2001. He also 
considers the difficulties in determining who was exposed and the 
effect of the exposures on a variety of subpopulations, consisting 
of responders who came to assist, transients who were in the 
vicinity on the day of the attack, and residents and school children 
who were in the neighborhood of Ground Zero on and after 
September 11. Dr. Howard also discusses the various 
compensation schemes that came into play and the tort actions that 
were instituted by some of those exposed, and he analyzes the 
complex causation and compensation issues that are likely to arise 
and will have to be explored in the years to come. By furnishing 
this detailed account, Dr. Howard has provided a foundation for 
further study of the medical, legal and political ramifications of 
September 11. His report should  be of enormous interest not only 
to those who are actively involved in grappling with the enormous 
problems and uncertainties that exist more than seven years after 
the attack, but also to those who are seeking to find lessons to 
apply if  some future disaster ensues. 
Professor Richard Scheines’ article, Causation, Statistics and 
the Law,9 presents a remarkably clear account of the nature of 
causal claims. Professor Scheines’ discussion contains numerous 
examples and illustrations that make a highly complex subject 
based on statistical reasoning much more comprehensible. While 
Dr. Howard’s article describes a fact pattern that is unfortunately 
not hypothetical, the Scheines article explains how the issue of 
                                                           
8 16 J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2007). 
9 16 J.L. & POL’Y 135 (2007). 
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causation should be approached by employing numerous 
hypotheticals that make clear just how difficult it will be to resolve 
some of the questions Dr. Howard raises. Professor Scheines bases 
some of his discussion on a hypothetical that was distributed to 
participants at the live program as part of the effort to encourage a 
more interactive approach. The hypothetical, to which Professor 
Scheines makes a number of references, is reprinted in its entirety 
at the end of these articles. 
As this is my last opportunity to do so, I want to express my 
gratitude to the Advisory Board that assisted in the planning of 
these programs and whose members spoke at some of the sessions. 
Many thanks to the Hon. Shirley Abrahamson, Chief Justice, 
Wisconsin; Dr. Joe Cecil, Project Director, Program on Scientific 
and Technical Evidence, Division of Research, Federal Judicial 
Center; Professor Joel E. Cohen, Abby Rockefeller Mauzé 
Professor and Head of the Laboratory of Populations, The 
Rockefeller University and Columbia University; Professor 
Richard A. Merrill, formerly Daniel Caplin Professor of Law, 
University of Virginia Law School; Professor Judith Resnik, Arthur 
Liman Professor, Yale Law School; and the Hon. Jack B. 
Weinstein, United States Senior District Judge, Eastern District of 
New York. I also want to thank the many persons at Brooklyn 
Law School who helped to make these programs possible, and 
especially the Dean of Brooklyn Law School, Joan G. Wexler, and 
Professor Karen Porter, the Executive Director of Brooklyn Law 
School’s Center for Health, Science and Public Policy, who handled  
many of the administrative chores required in organizing these 
programs. 
